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Being surprised about how often prices were dispersed in markets for apparently ho-
ogeneous products, Stigler (1961) 1 paved the way for a rich strand of the economics
iterature in which the information consumers have when they make decisions is the out-
ome of their own search effort. Since then, the consumer search literature has matured
o become an essential part of the toolkit an economist needs to master to understand the
unctioning of markets. Despite the long time that has elapsed since, the consumer search
iterature is recently more alive than ever b efore, esp ecially in Industrial Organization.
erhaps the principal reason is that Internet has made it even more palpable that con-
umer information acquisition via costly search is an essential characteristic of markets
nd thus cannot be neglected. For a firm, getting the consumer to inspect its product
s vital for otherwise a purchase is hard to materialize. This has led firms to reconsider
asic pricing principles. The great availability of data including not only purchase but
lso search behaviour has led firms to revise their price discrimination strategies, and
as contemporaneously opened exciting research avenues for empirical economists. 
This Special Section on Consumer Search puts together a group of recent papers each
ouching upon a new direction of research in the consumer search literature. The papers
re heterogeneous but the common thread is that modelling consumer search explicitly
an lead to a better understanding of the working of markets, sometimes challenging
onventional wisdom. More often than not, there are also important lessons to learn for
olicy. 
In the paper “Consumer Search on The Internet”, De los Santos explores one of the
rst datasets providing information on consumer search. In particular, he studies search
atterns for consumers buying b o oks online during 2002 and 2004. One important finding1 Stigler, George J.: “The Economics of Information,” The Journal of Political Economy 69, pp. 213-225, 
961. 
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is that consumers search relatively little: the average buyer performs around 1.2 searches. 
De los Santos also points out that the distribution of searches is quite unequally divided
across firms, with a strong bias towards some firms, in this case for the ma jor b o ok sellers
Amazon and Barnes & Noble. His paper motivates the idea that search is often directed
and that models need to be adapted to capture this feature of markets. 
Ding and Zhang’s paper, “Price-Directed Consumer Search”, is one of the earliest 
papers in which consumers’ search order can be influenced by the prices the firms charge.
To do so, they cleverly modify the famous Stahl’s (1989) 2 shopper and non-shopper model
by intro ducing pro duct differentiation. They show that non-shoppers will not search at
firms charging prices higher than a limit price that decreases in search costs. They derive
an equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that it may have a non-convex support,
with an interval of low prices and an interval of high prices. In contrast to conventional
wisdom, the average price in the market can decrease as the search cost goes up. 
Common sense, recently corroborated by some theoretical and empirical research, 
suggests that being first is best when consumers search through lists of options to find
a suitable alternative. In their paper “Search Prominence and Return Costs”, Fishman 
and Lubensky explicitly account for the costs consumers have to incur to return and
purchase previously inspected options to demonstrate that being first is not necessary 
b est. Sp ecifically, they explore the following trade-off: b eing insp ected first is superior if
it is likely that consumers find the product satisfactory because then search and return
costs discourage consumers to continue search. But b eing insp ected later is sup erior
when consumers are likely to find the product unsuitable at the first firm because then
the return costs make consumers buy the product of second firm even if it is worse than
the other. 
Only recently have economists started to study the implications of search frictions in 
a vertical relationship market. In their paper “Retail Channel Management in Consumer 
Search Markets”, García and Janssen investigate an upstream manufacturer’s incentive 
to price discriminate between two competing downstream retailers when consumers face 
search frictions. In particular, they show that provided that the manufacturer has some 
commitment power, it has an incentive to price discriminate because this encourages 
consumer search among retailers and so helps avoid the double marginalization outcome. 
Parakhonyak and Titova, in their paper “Shopping Malls, Platforms and Consumer 
Search”, apply search theory to understand how consumers navigate from platform to 
platform and how their navigation affects the prices firms operating in the platforms 
charge. They show that the most reasonable equilibrium has consumers visiting platforms 
in descending order of size. The firms operating in the biggest platforms charge lower 
prices but earn higher profits. If firms were given the option which platform to join, they
would all join the same platform if entry were free. A profit-maximizing platform would 
limit entry and the size of the platform would likely decrease as search cost goes up. 2 Stahl, Dale O.: “Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search,” The American Economic 
Review 79-4, pp. 700–712, 1989. 
































In their paper “A Search Model of Rental Markets: Who Should Pay the Commis-
ion?”, Niedermayer and Wang study the issue of whether tenants or landlords should
ay the commission in rental markets. They argue that fees paid by tenants can help
creen short-term and long-term tenants, which improves the match efficiency between
enants and landlords with different moving-out costs. Therefore, a policy that requires
andlords to pay the commission (which was recently implemented in Germany, for ex-
mple) may actually harm market efficiency. 
Product returns are commonplace, especially in the case of online shopping. They
ncourage consumers to order a product even without perfectly knowing its value. In her
aper “A Search Model of Costly Product Returns”, Petrikait ̇e finds that product return
osts play a similar role as search costs when prices are observable. Using the recent
nsights from price-directed search models, Petrikait ̇e shows that when returns become
ostlier, firms will set lower prices in order to attract consumers to visit first, and, as a
esult, consumers can become better off. 
Sequential search models with an optimal stopping rule are one way to formalize the
satisficing” idea in Simon (1955). 3 In reality many consumers may not carefully calculate
heir optimal stopping rule. Instead they may simply adopt an exogenous reservation
hreshold (e.g. an aspiration price in the case of price search), and the threshold might be
nfluenced by firms’ marketing activities. In his paper “Price Competition with Satisficing
onsumers”, Papi introduces this idea into a duop oly mo del of price comp etition by
llowing firms to cho ose b oth prices and marketing efforts. In equilibrium firms randomize
n both prices and marketing efforts and a higher marketing effort is always associated
ith higher prices. 
These papers exemplify recent exciting research avenues concerning the Industrial
rganization of markets where consumer search is a prominent feature. We hope that
hey will serve to inspire the IO community to continue the exploration of these markets.
José L. Moraga-González
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and University of Groningen
Jidong Zhou
Yale School of Management3 Simon, Herbert A.: “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , 69-1, 
p. 99–118, 1955. 
